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THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
IN CALIFORNIA
INTRODUCTION

In 1890, Samuel D. Warren collaborated with Louis D. Brandeis
to write a law review article destined to have a significant effect on
the development of law in American and English courts.' Their
article pleaded for the recognition of an independent "right to privacy," 2 and is probably the most outstanding example of the influence of legal periodicals upon the courts. Prior to 1890, there
had been no relief granted by English or American courts on the
basis of an invasion of such a right, although a few cases had reached
the same result through different means.' Warren and Brandeis
examined these cases, and found that relief had been ostensibly
4
granted on the basis of defamation, invasion of some property right,
or breach of confidence or of an implied contract,5 but that the decisions had actually been based on a much broader principle. This
principle, which they termed the "right to privacy," deserved separate recognition, they reasoned, and they went on to outline the
circumstances under which it would apply.
Their first rule was that the right of privacy does not prohibit
any publication of matter which is of public or general interest.' The
explanation of this rule indicated that the general object of their
theory was to protect the privacy of private life, "and to whatever
degree and in whatever connection a man's life has ceased to be
private, before the publication under consideration has been made,
to that extent, the protection is to be withdrawn."' The second rule
I

Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).

2 The term is difficult to define. See Davis, What Do We Mean by "Right to
Privacy," 4 S. DAK. L. REV. 1 (1959).

3 De May v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881) (intrusion upon childbirth); Lord Byron v. Johnston, 2 Mer. 29, 35 Eng. Rep. 851 (1816) (authorship
of spurious poem attributed to Lord Byron).
4 Woolsey v. Judd, 4 Duer 379, 11 How. Pr. 49 (N.Y. 1855)

(publication of

private letters) ; Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1811) (same);
Prince Albert v. Strange, 1 Mach. & G. 25, 41 Eng. Rep. 1171 (1849), afirmed, 2 De G.
& Sm. 652, 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (1849) (exhibition of private etchings and publication
of catalogue).
5 Yovatt v. Winyard, 1 Jac. & W. 394, 37 Eng. Rep. 425 (1820) (publication of
recipes obtained surreptitiously by employee); Abernathy v. Hutchinson, 3 L.J. Ch.
209 (1825) (publication of lectures delivered to class of which defendant was a

member); Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch. Div. 345 (1888)
plaintiff's picture made by defendant).

(publication of

6 Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 214 (1890).
7 Ibid: "Some things all men alike are entitled to keep from public curiosity,

whether in public life or not, while others are only private because persons concerned
have not assumed a position which makes their doings legitimate matters of public
investigation."

THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY

of application stated by Warren and Brandeis was that the right of
privacy does not prohibit communication of any private matter,
when publication occurs under circumstances which would render it
privileged communication according to the law of slander and libel.
They further stated that the law would probably grant no redress
for oral publication of private matter, unless some special damage
could be proven, and that the right of privacy ceases upon publication
of the facts by the individual, or with his consent. Truth of the
matter is no defense, nor is absence of malice a defense to an action
for invasion of privacy. The authors recommended that invasion of
privacy be recognized as an action in tort for damages, or, in special
instances, as an equitable action for an injunction. 8
Today, the courts of thirty states and the District of Columbia
recognize a right of privacy. The only states which still reject such
a cause of action are Rhode Island," ° Texas," Nebraska, 2 and
Wisconsin, 1" and the ground for rejection in these states is a reluctance to alter the common law without specific legislation.
8 Id. at 215. The first case to allow recovery on the independent basis of a right
of privacy was an unreported decision of a New York trial judge. An actress had
appeared on stage in a pair of tights, and defendant snapped her picture. Defendant
was enjoined from publishing the picture. Manola v. Stevens, N.Y. Super. Ct., reported
in New York Times, June 15, 18, 21, 1890. Other decisions followed. Schuyler v.
Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22 (1895); Marks v. Jaffa, 68 Misc. 290, 26 N.Y.S. 908
(Super. Ct. 1893); MacKenzie v. Soden Mineral Springs Co., 27 Abb. N. Cas. 402,
18 N.Y.S. 240 (Sup. Ct. Spec. 1891). However, in Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box
Company, 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902), a New York appellate court denied
recovery on the basis of a right of privacy because of lack of precedent, the mental
character of the claimed injury, fear of the flood of litigation which could result, the
difficulty of drawing a distinction between public figures and private persons, and a
fear of unduly restricting freedom of speech and of the press. Immediate public
disapproval of the decision led one of the concurring judges to write a law review
article defending his opinion. O'Brien, The Right of Privacy, 2 COL. L. REv. 437
(1902). Shortly thereafter, New York enacted a statute, which remains the law of the
state today, making it both a tort and a misdemeanor to use the name or picture
of any person for "advertising purposes" without their consent. N.Y. SEss. LAWS
1903, ch. 132, §§ 1-2. Now, as amended in 1921, N.Y. CiviL RIGHTS LAW, §§ 50-51.
This statute has been used as a model for the similar statutes of Oklahoma, Utah, and
Virginia.
Georgia was the next state to recognize an independent right of privacy. Pavesich
v. New England Life Insurance Company, 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905). But the
decisions in most of the other states remained split between the view of the New York
court in the Roberson case, and the views of Warren and Brandeis, and the Georgia
court. However, when the Restatement of Torts devoted a section to the invasion of
privacy, RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 687 (1939), other states began to recognize this tort,
overruling previous decisions.
9 PROSSER, TORTS 831 (3d ed. 1964).
10 Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73 Atl. 97 (1909).
11 Milner v. Red River Valley Pub. Co., - Tex Civ. App. -, 249 S.W.2d 227
(Civ. App. 1952).
12 Brunson v. Ranks Army Stores, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955).
13 Yoeckel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925 (1956).
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The right of privacy, as developed in about four hundred cases
to date, has been used as a basis for tort liability in four distinct
areas.' 4 They consist of:
1. intrusion on the plaintiff's solitude or seclusion 15
2. public disclosure of private facts 6
3. publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the
public eye' 7
4. appropriation of the plaintiff's name or likeness for defendant's benefit. 8
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN CALIFORNIA

The development of an independent right of privacy in California has been rapid and enlightened in most respects. The only
remaining problem areas are in the development of realistic tests
for distinguishing between public figures and private persons, and
14 See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960). See generally id. at 398.

15 Young v. Western & A.R. Co., Ga. App. 761, 148 S.E. 414 (1929) (search
without a warrant); Newcomb Hotel Co. v. Corbett, 27 Ga. App. 365, 108 S.E. 309
(1921) (intrusion into hotel room); Sutherland v. Kroger Co., 144 W. Va. 673, 110
S.E.2d 716 (1959) (illegal search of shopping bag in store); Rhodes v. Graham, 238
Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931) (wire tapping private conversation) ; Roach v. Harper,
143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958) (recording private conversation with hidden
microphones); Moore v. New York Elevated R.R., 130 N.Y. 523, 29 N.E. 997 (1892)
(peering into windows of home); Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340
(1956), aff'g, 99 Ohio App. 485, 135 N.E.2d 440 (1955) (persistent and unwanted
telephone calls); Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 146 Ad. 34 (1929) (unauthorized
prying into bank account).
16 Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 867 (1927)

(sign in window pro-

claiming debt, owed by plaintiff, to the public eye); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App.
285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931) (motion picture revealed past history and name of prostitute
who was reformed and now a respectable member of society) ; Feeney v. Young, 191
App. Div. 501, 181 N.Y.S. 481 (1920) (public exhibition of films of caesarian operation).
17 Lord Byron v. Johnston, 2 Mer. 29, 35 Eng. Rep. 851 (1816) (circulation of
a bad poem attributed to plaintiff's authorship) ; Pavesich v. New England Life Ins.
Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) (fictitious testimonial used in advertising); State
ex rel. La Follette v. Hinkle, 131 Wash. 86, 229 Pac. 317 (1924) (unauthorized use of
name as candidate for office) ; Marks v. Jaffa, 6 Misc. 290, 26 N.Y.S. 908 (Super. Ct.
1893) (entry of an actor, without his consent, in an embarrassing popularity
contest) ; Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952) (use of plaintiff's
picture to illustrate article on profane love).
18 Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (1942) (name
used without consent to advertise defendant's product) ; Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co.,
347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952) (plaintiff's picture used in advertisement without consent); Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 At. 392 (1907)
(name and picture used on product to add luster to name of corporation); Lane v.
F. W. Woolworth Co., 171 Misc. 66, 11 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd mem., 256
App. Div. 1065, 12 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1939) (plaintiff's picture used to accompany an
article sold).'
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between the public and private lives of a public figure. It is ironic
that this inadequacy in the law continues today, over seventy-five
years after Warren and Brandeis wrote their celebrated article,
inspired by just such an invasion of the private life of a public
figure.' 9 In the face of modern technological advances in news reporting and communications, it is becoming obvious that the courts
need to refine their techniques for deciding right of privacy cases involving public figures. Two major refinements will be suggested in
this comment: first, that the courts explicity recognize a distinction
between voluntary and involuntary public figures, and second, that
the courts more clearly distinguish between the public and private
life of a public figure on the basis of the degree of notability possessed
by the individual. Both of these suggestions have received the implicit approval of the California courts in a number of cases. Explicit approval of these concepts is now required if judicial treatment
of privacy cases is to attain that degree of sophistication which will
allow equitable results in our modern society.
The landmark California case on the right of privacy, Melvin
v. Reid,2" was decided in 1931. At that time the right of privacy was
recognized as a distinct right in only a handful of other jurisdictions2
in the United States. The section of the Restatement of Torts, 1
which recognizes a right of privacy as an actionable right, had not
yet been written, and a majority of the cases decided in the United
States were based on statutory law similar to the New York Civil
Rights Laws.2 2 Thus, the California Supreme Court had very little
precedent to examine in deciding this case.
The facts of Melvin present a classic instance of the public disclosure of facts about the plaintiff's past life which caused her extreme embarrassment and mental anguish. 23 The defendant had produced a motion picture, entitled The Red Kimono, which revealed
details of the plaintiff's life as a prostitute, and -revealed her true
identity. At the time of the events portrayed in the motion picture,
19 Mrs. Warren was a member of the socially elite in Boston (daughter of Senator
Bayard of Delaware), and her husband was a prominent lawyer and merchant. Shortly
before the article was written, several Boston newspapers had printed embarrassingly
detailed accounts of a few parties which Mrs. Warren had given. Of course, Boston
high society frowned upon the names of ladies and gentlemen appearing in the
newspapers at all, but to make matters worse, these newspaper accounts were full of
personal details which made them all the more shocking and embarrassing. After the
newspapers added insult to injury by printing even more perplexing accounts of
their daughter's wedding, Mr. Warren resolved to do something about it. See Prosser,
Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383 (1960).
20 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931).
21 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 687 (1939).
22 N.Y. CiviL RIGHTs LAW, §§ 50-51.
23 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931).
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the plaintiff was a witness at a murder trial. Since that time, however,
the plaintiff had reformed her life, married, and found a place for
herself in respectable society. The facts revealed in the motion
picture caused her to be ostracized from the community in which she
lived and otherwise excluded from the society of which she was a
member.
In laying the foundations for its decision, the court postulated
some general principles which still provide a good definition of the
right of privacy in California. The court distilled those principles
from concepts which "seem to run through most of the better considered decisions from jurisdictions which recognize the doctrine, as
well as those which do not."2 4 Briefly, the precepts enunciated by the
court were as follows. First, the right of privacy is a personal right
and not a property right. As such, it does not survive, but dies with
the person. Second, the right of privacy does not exist where the
person has published the matter complained of himself, or consented to publication of the matter by others. Third, the right of
privacy does not exist "where a person has become so prominent
that by his very prominence, he has dedicated his life to the public,
and thereby waived his right to privacy."25 Fourth, no right of privacy exists "in the dissemination of news and news events, nor in
the discussion of events of the life of a person in whom the public
has a rightful interest, nor where the information would be of public
benefit, as in the case of a candidate for public office." 26 Fifth, the
right of privacy is violated only by "printings, writings, pictures, or
other permanent publications or reproductions, and not by word of
mouth."2 7 Finally, the right of action accrues when the publication is
made for gain or profit.
Recognizing that many of the above principles had been derived
from statutory law in the various jurisdictions, the court declined to
recognize the right of privacy as the basis for an action in tort in
California. Instead, the court based its decision on an "inalienable
right, guaranteed . . . by our Constitution, to pursue and obtain

happiness."2 8 The court went on to say, "Whether we call this a right
of privacy or give it any other name is immaterial, because it is a
right guaranteed by our Constitution that must not be ruthlessly and
needlessly invaded by others."29
Since Melvin v. Reid, approximately twenty-five cases have
Id. at 290, 297 Pac. at 92.
Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Id. at 292, 297 Pac. at 93-94.
29 Ibid.
24
25
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reached the California appellate courts involving the right of privacy.
The right of privacy has been distinguished from the right of freedom
from defamation on the basis that the cause of action in a privacy
case is not for an injury to the character or reputation, but for a
direct wrong to the person, resulting in injured feelings or other
mental distress, but without regard to any effect on property, business, pecuniary interest, or standing.3" A lack of malice has been
held to be no defense to an action for invasion of privacy."1 Liability
for invasion of privacy has been limited to the instances where defendant's conduct was such that the defendant should have realized
that it would offend persons of ordinary sensibilities.3 2 The facts concerning arrest and prosecution of those charged with violation of the
law have been held matters of public interest, and publication of
such facts has been held not to constitute an invasion of privacy."
Wire-tapping has been held to constitute an invasion of privacy,
except in cases where it is legally authorized and the information
obtained is beneficial to the public.34
Probably the most difficult problem which the California courts,
as well as the other American courts, have had to deal with throughout the development of a legally recognized right of privacy has been
the problem of distinguishing between private persons and public
figures. In order to prove that he has been injured by an alleged invasion of his privacy, a claimant must first show that he has a private
life. In the case of a public figure, this may be very difficult. The
distinction is clear in theory, but often quite difficult to apply in
individual cases. Warren and Brandeis foresaw a problem in the
application of the law of privacy to public figures when they observed, "Some things all men alike are entitled to keep from public
curiosity, whether in public life or not, while others are only private
because persons concerned have not assumed a position which makes
their doings legitimate matters of public investigation.""
Most of the American courts have been loathe to recognize the
proposition that a public figure may also have a private life, in addition to his public life. Upon reading some of the opinions, many of
which have dealt with actors and actresses, one is left with the distinct impression that judicial disapproval of the theatrical profession
has at least been a factor in such decisions.3 6 Aside from this however,
30 Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equipment Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 291 P.2d
194 (1955).
31 Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (1942).
32 Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952).
33 Coverstone v. Davis, 38 Cal. 2d 315, 239 P.2d 876 (1952).
34 People v. Trieber, 28 Cal. 2d 657, 171 P.2d 1 (1946).

35 Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 214 (1890).
36 "Actresses and actors seek publicity and often adopt various and sundry ways
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a number of more valid reasons continue to appear in decisions which
hold that public persons have lost their right of privacy. First, it is
argued that they have sought publicity and consented to it, and
therefore cannot complain when they receive it. The second reason
commonly given is that their personalities and their affairs already
have become public, and can no longer be regarded as their private
business. Finally, and perhaps most legitimately, it is argued that
the press has a privilege, guaranteed by the Constitution, to inform
the public about those who have become legitimate matters of public
interest. Regardless of the reasons given, the rule of law is mechanically and almost universally applied in cases involving public figures
that a public person has no right of privacy.
In addition to their disregard for the distinction between the
public and private life of a public figure, the American courts display another attitude which is a terrific handicap to invasion of privacy claimants. The American courts, always sensitive to arguments
based upon the constitutionally-guaranteed rights of freedom of
speech and freedom of the press, consistently place participants in
news events in the category of public persons with respect to the
event under consideration. And once these otherwise private citizens
have been classified as public figures related to a particular news
event, very few additional facts are required to strip an individual
of his right of privacy if the rule that a public figure has no right of
privacy is applied mechanically.
The California court in Melvin v. Reid showed an enlightened
regard for the private life of the plaintiff who had undoubtedly been a
public figure while she was a witness at a murder trial. The court
considered the lapse of time (fifteen years) between the events
surrounding the trial and the time of the publication of the motion
picture sufficient to restore the plaintiff to the status of a private
person. Note that in this case the plaintiff had become a public figure
only because she was a participant in a news event, i.e., the murder
trial. And the involuntary nature of the plaintiff's participation in
this event was definitely, although impliedly, a factor in the court's
decision. 7
of securing such notoriety as will attract attention to them. They cannot expect to lead
quiet secluded lives. They will be criticized, justly or otherwise for their performances.
This court is of the opinion that any person following the theatrical business for a
life's work has no such right of privacy as the plaintiff attempts to assert in her
complaint. Her embarkation on this vocation in life has estopped her from a right to
be heard to complain that her personal right of privacy has been invaded." Martin v.
F. I. Y. Theatre Co., 10 Ohio Op. 338, 340 (C. P. Duyahoga County 1938). Also:
"[C]ommon observation teaches us that the greatest asset to a star is constant
publicity." Paramount Pictures v. Leader Press Co., 24 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (D. Okla.
1938), rev'd, 106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939).
37 112 Cal. App. at 287, 297 Pac. at 93.
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In a later case, Cohen v. Marx,88 "Canvasback" Cohen, a retired prizefighter sued Groucho Marx for the invasion of his privacy
occasioned by some remarks the defendant had made on a radio
program. Groucho named "Canvasback" as a fighter he had managed,
and said that he had made him walk back to Cleveland after he was
knocked out in a fight in Los Angeles. "Canvasback" had been a
prizefighter of some repute at the time, but had retired from the
ring about ten years prior to the radio program. The court gave this
definition of a public figure:
A person who by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of life, or by
adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate
interest in his doings, affairs, or character, is said to become a public9
personage, and thereby relinquishes a part of his right of privacy.

The court found "Canvasback" to be a public figure under this
definition during his ring career, and they would not allow him to
retreat into seclusion and hold others liable for commenting on acts
which had taken place at a time when he was voluntarily exposing
himself to the public eye. But even in deciding for the defendant, the
court implicity recognized the distinction between the public and
private life of the plaintiff: "It is evident that when plaintiff sought
publicity and the adulation of the public, he relinquished his right
to privacy on matters pertaining to his professional activity."' In
comparing this case to Melvin v. Reid, note that "Canvasback" was
a voluntary public figure, and not just a participant in a news event,
which accounts to a large degree for the court's refusal to allow him
to hide his past acts from the public eye.
In Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp.,"' the plaintiff was suing
the producers of the motion picture, Sands of Iwo Jima, on the
grounds that they had publicized certain aspects of his life (as
Sergeant Stryker) and fictionalized other portions, without his consent. The court found that the plaintiff was a public figure, but that
the general public had a legitimate concern only in the record of a
war hero's military service, and no more. In other words, the court
found that Sergeant Stryker was a public figure, but that the plaintiff had a tenable private life as well. However, the court went on to
say that, "A politician, running for public office, in effect, offers his
public and private life for perusal so far as it affects his bid for
office." 2 The point to recognize here is that the court was willing to
recognize degrees of "notability," and to draw the line between a
38

94 Cal. App. 2d 704, 211 P.2d 320 (1949).

89
40
41
42

Id. at 705, 211 P.2d at 321. (Emphasis added.)
Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
108 Cal. App. 2d 191, 238 P.2d 670 (1951).
Id. at 194, 238 P.2d at 672.
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person's public life and his private life dependent upon the degree
of notability which he possessed. This view is in accord with the
orginal view of Warren and Brandeis that the more "public" a person
becomes, the more limited is his private life.
43 a
In an unreported case, Douglas v. Disney Productions,
California court indicated that even a public figure as notable as
Kirk Douglas possesses some right to a private life. Kirk Douglas
had engaged in some horseplay before a friend's home movie camera.
Later, when the defendant obtained the film and incorporated it into
one of its productions for public showing, Douglas was held to have
a cause of action for invasion of his privacy.

The cases cited above indicate that the California courts have
at least been sympathetic to the distinction with which Warren and
Brandeis were concerned-the distinction between the private and
public life of a public figure. And the courts have considered this
distinction, as well as the distinction between voluntary and involuntary public figures in arriving at their decisions. But the courts
have not really formulated these distinctions. Furthermore, there
have been several California cases which indicate a reluctance by
courts to recognize any right of privacy in those it labels as public
figures.
In Werner v. Times Mirror,44 a case with facts very similar to
Melvin v. Reid, the plaintiff was a former city attorney. Werner had
resigned from the office of city attorney after a scandal which led to
his disbarment and his first wife's conviction for grand theft. About
thirty years later, after the plaintiff had reformed his life and been
re-admitted to the bar on the basis of his moral rehabilitation, he
applied for a wedding license to marry his second wife. The defendant newspaper, upon learning of his application, published an
article entitled, "Former City Attorney Werner to Wed Again"
which recounted all of the events leading to his disbarment and
resignation. Werner brought suit for an invasion of privacy, and
despite an eloquent dissent based on Melvin v. Reid,4 5 dismissal of
the suit was affi.rmed. The court stated that, "mere passage of time
does not preclude the publication of such incidents from the life of
one formerly in the public eye, which are already public property."4
But this case can be reconciled with Melvin v. Reid if the nature of
the public figure involved is considered. In Melvin, the plaintiff was
an involuntary public figure, and the passage of fifteen years was
43 Civil No. C-664346, Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, -Calif., reported in Los
Angeles Daily Journal Reporter, December 31, 1956, at 27, col. 3.
44 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1961).
45 Id. at 123, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
46 Id. at 118, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
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held to be sufficient to restore her to the status of a private person.
However, in Werner, the plaintiff was a voluntary public figure who
possessed a high degree of notability during his public life. The court,
in effect, held that for such a person even the passage of thirty years
was insufficient to restore him to the status of a private person.
47 a scandal magazine,
In Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications,
in an
article entitled "Janet Leigh's Own Story-I Was a Child Bride at
14!" implicated the plaintiff as the one who lured the innocent Miss
Leigh into this premature marriage. He claimed public disclosure of
private facts and publicity which placed him in a false light in the
public eye. The court paid lip service to a "nice discrimination between the private 'right to be let alone' and the public right to news
and information,"4 8 but went on to hold that "people closely related

to ...

public figures in their activities must also to some extent lose

their right of privacy that one unconnected with the famous or
notorious would have."49 Thus, in this case, the court reasoned that
since Miss Leigh was a voluntary public figure with a high degree of
notability, the public had a right to information concerning her past
life. Since the plaintiff was a part of her past life, he was essentially a
participant in a news event, and therefore also a public figure to the
extent of his participation in that event. The fact that the marriage
itself was a matter of public record lent weight to the court's classification of the incident as a news event.
Smith v. NationalBroadcastingCompany50 was a case involving
a private citizen who became the principal character in a rather
humiliating news item. The plaintiff had reported to the police that a
black panther had escaped from his truck while in transit through
the city of Los Angeles. The report was made in good faith, but a
police investigation disclosed that the panther reached its destination
without incident. However, between the time the plaintiff made the
report and the time of the completion of the investigation, the information reached the news media, and many residents of the area
became badly frightened. The police arrested the plaintiff for filing
a false report, subjected him to a psychiatric examination, and detained him until the results proved him mentally sound. The plaintiff
suffered much mental anguish, was subjected to public ridicule and
scorn, and lost his job after the newspapers published a story explaining the entire incident. Three months later, the defendant produced a radio dramatization of the news story, and the plaintiff
sought an injunction to prevent the telecast of a similar dramatiza47 201 Cal. App. 2d 733, 20 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1962).

Id. at 745, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
Id. at 747, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
5o 138 Cal. App. 2d 807, 292 P.2d 600 (1956).
48
49
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tion. The court held that the plaintiff had no cause of action for
invasion of privacy because he had become a public figure by his
actions and had "renounced his right of privacy insofar as this
particular incident was concerned." 1 The court mechanically applied
the rule that participants in news events are public figures and therefore have no right of privacy.
These cases illustrate the ease with which a court can classify
an apparently private individual as a public figure, and thus strip
him of his right of privacy.
ANALYSIS

It is common knowledge in this day and age that the newspapers
and other news media, besides having far more effective means for
gathering news at their disposal, probe deeper into the people and
events which make up these news items. A mother just informed of
her son's death has a microphone thrust at her so that she may describe her feelings of the moment to a nation-wide radio and television audience. The private lives of actors and actresses, who normally appear to the general public only on the motion picture or
television screen, appear across the front pages of scores of newspapers across the country. An astronaut's wife is quizzed mercilessly
before the television cameras about her feelings as her husband
carries out an extremely hazardous mission in space. All of these
people could be classified as public figures-have they no right to
privacy?
The old arguments of the California and other American courts
that such people have either sought and consented to this publicity,
or that their affairs have already become public, require closer examination in light of today's more effective information-gathering
technology. Have these people sought publicity? Or have their lives
suddenly become public simply because of the advent of telephoto
lenses, portable television cameras, and directional microphones
which can record their every act and word from a distance?
There is no argument, in theory, with the privilege of the press
to inform the public on legitimate matters of public interest. But
there is much disagreement on the extent of that privilege. News is
difficult to define, and can perhaps only be described as including all
events and items of information outside of the normal everyday
routine, and which have "that indefinable quality of information
which arouses public attention."5 2 The pages of the daily paper are
51
52

Id. at 812, 292 P.2d at 604.
Sweenek v. Pathe News, 16 F. Supp. 746, 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1936).
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probably more illustrative. A typical sampling will include murders,
suicides, divorces, marriages, accidents, crimes of all varieties, and
many other matters of popular appeal. The material which a newspaper may print is not limited to current events, but may include
educational, historical, and geographical information, as well as
entertainment and amusement.
Obviously, there must be some limit to this privilege. Those
courts which recognize a limit to the extent to which a public person
is public, seem also to recognize a limit to the privilege of the press,'3
and usually reach their decision by balancing one against the other.
But further refinement of this equitable approach is necessary if the
rights of privacy of both public and private individuals are to be
adequately protected in our modern society.
The major refinements required in the courts' equitable treatment of public figures in right of privacy cases are twofold. First,
the courts must clearly formulate a distinction between voluntary and
involuntary public figures. Second, the courts should clearly distinguish between the public and private life of a public figure on the
basis of the degree of notability possessed by the individual.
The first distinction suggested above appears, at least implicitly,
in a number of California cases. 4 A person who voluntarily becomes
5
a public figure, within the definition given in Cohen v. Marx, obviously warrants a more limited protection of his right of privacy
than an otherwise private individual who becomes an involuntary
participant in a news event. Thus, if a person voluntarily seeks
publicity, either by actively seeking public attention or by embarking
upon a profession or career which necessarily thrusts him into the
limelight, he should be classified as a voluntary public figure and his
right of privacy limited accordingly. But if the individual was a
private person up to the time of a particular newsworthy event, and
then was thrust into the public eye simply because of his participation in this event, without any voluntary publicity-seeking acts on
his part, he should be classified as an involuntary public figure with a
much broader right of privacy than that possessed by the voluntary
public figure.
53 Garner v. Triangle Publications, 97 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Baker v.
Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N.E. 109 (1912); Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp., 108
Cal. App. 2d 191, 238 P.2d 670 (1951) ; and see Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119
Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E.2d 306 (1949).
54 Werner v. Times Mirror, 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1961); Cohen
v. Marx, 94 Cal. App. 2d 704, 211 P.2d 320 (1949); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285,
297 Pac. 91 (1931).
55 "A person who by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of life, or by adopting
a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, affairs,
or character, is said to become a public personage, and thereby relinquishes a part of
his right of privacy." 94 Cal. App. 2d at 705, 211 P.2d at 321.
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Explicit recognition of this first distinction would still be somewhat meaningless in certain cases unless the court is willing to make
the second distinction suggested above. In every case involving a
voluntary or involuntary public figure, the court should determine
the extent to which the public figure has effectively waived his right
to privacy. It is suggested that this determination can most equitably
be made on the basis of the degree of notability possessed by the
individual. Those public figures extremely well known by the public
possess a high degree of notability and a correspondingly limited
right to privacy. An example of such an extremely notable public
figure is the President of the United States. At the other end of the
scale is a participant in a minor news event. Such a person falls into
the classification of an involuntary public figure with a very low
degree of notability, and thus one who waives only a very small portion of his right to privacy.
A California case already discussed in which the court considered the degree of notability of a plaintiff and drew the line between his private life and his public life on this basis was Stryker v.
Republic Pictures Corp. 6 In Stryker, the plaintiff was a war hero;
the court held that his public life was limited to those facts which
appeared in his war record, but they added that if the person involved was a candidate for public office or a public official, his public
life may include all those facts which affect his bid for office or
administration of that office.
When considering the degree of notability of a voluntary public
figure, the court should consider the previous fame of the person and
the field in which he has been famous. Some fields, such as show
business, sports, and politics, involve greater exposure than others,
such as literature, science, and law. Consequently, persons who have
gained their fame as entertainers possess a higher degree of notability
than those who are -renowned scientists.5 7 In the case of involuntary
public figures, these considerations do not apply because the involuntary public figure has no previous fame by definition.
56 108 Cal. App. 2d 191, 238 P.2d 670 (1951).
57 In cases involving the appropriation of an individual's name or likeness for
defendant's benefit, wherein plaintiff could be classified as a voluntary public figure,
the novel approach of a recent case in a federal court is interesting. In Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum Co., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 816 (1953), the court stated that in addition to a right of privacy, a man has a
right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive
privilege of pdblishing his picture. A famous person may wish to prevent appropriation
of the public appeal of his personality by telecast reproduction of his performance,
a biography, or by the use of his photograph for illustrating newspapers or magazines.
The right of privacy, as we have seen, may not be upheld due to the fact that he
has past exposure to the public limelight. But the right of publicity could not be denied
on this basis.

19671

THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY

In addition to the two major distinctions which have just been
described, several other factors should be considered by the courts in
right of privacy cases involving public figures. The occasion for
public interest in the individual, the nature of the private facts revealed, the possibility of an implied consent to publication, and the
nature of the actual damages claimed must all be taken into consideration by the court.
The courts should examine in depth the occasion for the public
interest in an individual regardless of whether he is a voluntary or
involuntary public figure. In the case of a truly newsworthy event,
involving either a voluntary or involuntary public figure, the individual's right of privacy must almost invariably be subordinated
to the freedom of the press. But in cases of questionably newsworthy
items, such as articles in scandal magazines and gossip columns,
where the primary aim is to increase circulation, the court must
probe more deeply. The overall tenor of the publication, as well as
the time and circumstances of the publication, should be considered
to determine whether the primary function of the publisher is the
dissemination of news and information as a service to the public, or
whether his only goals are commercial and his only motives profitseeking.
The nature of the private facts revealed should be examined in
light of all the circumstances attendant upon publication. In the case
of a voluntary public figure, the dividing line between private and
public facts is drawn strictly upon the basis of his degree of notability; the only question here is whether the facts revealed in the
publication fall within the confines of his private life as previously
outlined by the court. In the case of an involuntary public figure the
considerations are slightly more involved. Since the public life of the
involuntary public figure is usually restricted to a single news event
or story, the facts revealed must be examined closely to determine
their relevance to the event. Only those facts which are truly relevant
to the news event should be revealed. Another important consideration in the case of an involuntary public figure is the accuracy of the
facts revealed. Involuntary public figures should be protected more
fully against irresponsible reporting than voluntary public figures
because such reporting creates a severe risk of irremediable harm to
individuals involuntarily exposed to it and powerless to protect
themselves against it. In fact, it has been suggested that the press be
held to a duty of reasonable care when reporting news events involving such involuntary celebrities."
Finally, note that all of the above discussion is valid only if the
plaintiff can prove that the invasion of his privacy was without his
58 Time, Inc. v. Hill, -

U.S. -,

87 Sup. Ct. 534, 553 (1967)

(separate opinion).
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consent, express or implied, and that he actually suffered damage
thereby. The plaintiff cannot recover without proof of these two
elements.5"
CONCLUSION

The law of privacy in California is replete with decisions implying a limited right of privacy for public figures. Unless this limited
right is formulated more clearly, there is danger that it will vanish."
Also, in the light of modern technological advances in news reporting
and communications, the classification of news event participants as
public figures is becoming increasingly inequitable. Unless a more
realistic classification for such news event participants is devised,
these individuals are also in danger of losing their right of privacy.6
The California courts are strongly urged to consider the recommendations described herein as possible safeguards for the privacy
rights of public figures. Although adoption of these refinements will
not always assure the complete protection of an individual's right
of privacy, it is certain that the results of such an approach will be
more in accord with Warren and Brandeis's original views. And, more
significantly, such an approach will prevent the mechanical application of the law of privacy to public figures.
Anthony C. Fague
59 Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 290, 297 Pac. 91, 92 (1931).
60 In a recent decision, Time, Inc. v. Hill, - U.S. -, 87 Sup. Ct. 534 (1967),
the Supreme Court reviewed an action brought by an involuntary public figure under
the New York Civil Rights Law, sections 50-51. This statute clearly defines a right of
privacy. However the Court reviewed New York decisions construing the statute and
concluded that in cases involving public figures, the New York courts had interpreted
this statute so that "fictionalization" was required to state a cause of action, and
truth was a complete defense. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., - N.Y. -, 221 N.E.2d
543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877 (Ct. App. 1966). Based on this interpretation of New York
law, the Supreme Court held that the constitutional protections of speech and press
preclud the application of the New York statute to redress false reports of matters of
public interest in absence of proof that the defendant published the report with
knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth. Thus, New York by
construing their statute as including traditional defamation and libel requirements
severely restricted its usefulness as a protection of the right of privacy.
61 "The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety
and decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has
become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a
prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the
daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip,
which can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle. The intensity and
complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some
retreat from the world, and man, under the refining influence of culture, has become
more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become essential to the
individual; but modern enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his
privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted
by mere bodily injury." Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 196 (1890).

